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RECENT CASES
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-PROVOCATION-MITIGATION.-BAUMGARTUER V.
HODGDON, II6 N. W. 1O3O (MINN.).-In an apparently friendly discussion
as to the merits of a certain horse, carried on by the parties to this action
and others,the plaintiff, in a good-natured way, remarked either that the
defendant had "a thing of a horse," or that the horse was 'the damnedest
looking horse" plaintiff ever saw. Whereupon, defendant flew into
a passion and violently assaulted plaintiff, inflicting serious injuries to his
person. Held, that the Trial Court in charging the jury that neither re-
mark could be considered in mitigation of damages, committed no error.
Mere words spoken, however much they may be calculated to excite
and irritate, do not justify an assault and battery. Richardson v. Zuntz,
26 La. Ann. 313. But they may constitute a ground for the reduction of
damages. Donnelly v. Harris et al., 41 Ill. 126; Byers v. Homer, 47 Md.
23. To be within this class, the words relied on must be such as to induce
a presumption that the violence done was committed under immediate
influence of the feelings and passions excited by them. Chandler v. New-
ton, 3 Ky. Law. Rep. 927; Butt v. Gould, 34 Ind. 552. In addition to the
foregoing, it is essential that the words relied on must be such as to heat
the blood or arouse the passions of a reasonable man. Daniel v. Giles, io8
Tenn. 242.
BIGAMY-INTENT-PEOPLE V. SPOOR, 85 N. E. 207 (ILL.).-Held, that
in a prosecution for bigamy, a bona fide belief in the death or divorce of
the first wife is no defense, as the criminal intent is inferred from the
criminality of the act itself. Vickers, J., dissenting.
It is laid down in Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. i45, that ignorance of
fact but not of law, may tend to show lack of criminal intent. That
ignorance of law is no defence is well settled. State v. Robins, 28 N. C.
23; In re Ven Pelt, i City Hall Rec. 137. But as regards ignorance of
fact as a defence to a prosecution for bigamy, the cases are in irreconcil-
able conflict. In England, it is well settled that on the principle of actus non
facit reum nisi meus sit rea, an honest and reasonable belief in the exis-
tence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act for which a
prisoner is indicted an innocent one, is a good defense. Hearne v. Garton,
2 E. & E. 66. Some states in this country have adopted a like view.
Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459; State v. Stank, 9 Ohio Dec. 8. But in Massa-
chusetts the English doctrine is repudiated, it being declared that the
crime consists of doing the unlawful act, and criminal intent is not essen-
tial. Commonwealth v. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453. To the same effect are
Dotson v. State, 62 Ala. 141; State v. Hughes, 58 Ia. i65.
BAILMENT-ACTIONS-PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.-JOHN-
SON V. PERKINS, 62 S. E. 152 (GA.).-Held, that in all cases of bailment,
after proof of loss, the burden of proof is on the bailee to show diligence.
The general rule in actions of negligence is that the burden is on the
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plaintiff, not only to show an injury done him by the defendant, but also.
to show that it was due to the defendant's negligence. Turtellot v. Rose-
brook, ii Met. 46o. But the amount of evidence necessary to make
out a prima facie case differs according to the circumstances. Cooley on
Torts, Vol. 2, p. 1414. In actions against bailees based on negligence, it
is held by some authorities that the mere proof of loss or injury does not
alone make out a prima facie case, but that the plaintiff must prove that
loss was due to the neglect of the bailee. Story on Bailments, § 410;
Cross v. Brown, 41 N. H. 283; Brown v. Johnson, 29 Tex. 43. The
weight of authority, however, holds that in such cases a failure to fulfill
a duty by a bailee or an injury done in fulfilling it makes out a prima facie
case and shifts the burden of proceeding to the defendant. Boise v. Hart-
ford and N. H. R. Co., 37 Conn. 272; Stewart v. Stone, 127 N. Y. 5oo-
Following this rule, the Georgia Code, § 2896, provides that "in all cases
of bailments after proof of loss, the burden of proof is on the bailee to
show proper diligence." Cent. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 58 Ga. 393.
CARRIERs-LIABILITY OF CARRIER-DUTY OF SHIPPER TO INSPECT CAR.-
CLEVELAND, C., C. & ST. L. Ry. Co. v. LouisviLLE TIN & STOVE Co., In
S. W. 358 (Ky.).-Held, that it is not the duty of a shipper to inspect a
car furnished by a carrier, or to exercise care to know whether the car is
in condition; but he may assume that the carrier would not have directed
the placing of the goods in the car unless it was suitable.
The duty to inspect vehicles of conveyance lies upon the carrier. Em-
pire Transp. Co. v. Wamsutta Oil Co., 63 Pa. St. 14, and it is an insurer
as against such perils as arise from the use of defective or inadequate
instruments of carriage. Terre Haute & L R. Co. v. Crews, 53 Ill. App.
50; Costigan v. Michael Transp. Co. 33- Mo. App. 269. The weight
of authority is that it may be relieved of this responsibility as
insurer when the shipper retains an inspector to select and ap-
prove the cars to be used. Carr v. Schafer, 5 Colo. 48; and when there is
a distinct contract relieving from such liability. Gage v. Tirrell, 91 Mass.
2W9; South & N. A. R. Co. v. Wood, 66 Ala. 167. But it has been held
that a mere provision in a contract of carriage accepting car is not suffi-
cient to waive defect. Wallingfqrd v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 26 S. C. 258.
And, likewise, the mere knowledge by the shipper of unsuitable condition-
of car is insufficient to relieve carrier. Pratt v. Ogdensburg & L. C. R.
Co., i'o Mass. 557; Schwinger v. Raymond, 83 N. Y. 192.
CARRIERS-VALIDITY OF EXPRESS RECEIPTs-ExEMPTIONS FROM LIABIL-
ITY.-GREEWALD v. WEIR, III N. Y. Supp. 235-The Interstate Commerce-
Act of Feb. 4, 1887, provides that any carrier shall be liable for the loss.
of property, and that no contract shall exempt such carrier from the
liability thereby imposed. In an action brought under this act, held, that
the clause in an express receipt, .attempting to limit the carrier's liability
to $5o.00, or to exempt it from all liability in excess of that sum was void.
Dayton, J., dissenting.
A carrier and the shipper may agree upon the value of the property
to be shipped and limit the liability of the carrier accordingly. Coupland
v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 6i Conn. 531; Groves v. Lake Shore & Michigan
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So. R. R. Co., 137 Mass. 33; or if the contract fixed a maximum value of
the property, and it was agreed that in case of loss the recovery should
not exceed that value, this is equally binding. Alair v. Northern Pac. R.
R. Co., 53 Minn. i6o; Hart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 112 U. S: 331. But the
decisions are practically uniform in holding that a carrier cannot by special
contract limit its liability to an arbitrary sum, fixed without reference to
the value of the property. Ullman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. R. Co.,
112 Wis. i5o; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Owen, 93 Ky. 201.
CONTEMPT-DISOBEDIENCE TO DECREE-ORAL ADVICE OF JUDGE.-LEwIS
V. BRENNAN, JUDGE, 117 N. W. 279 (IowA)-Where a decree requires a
building to be closed, as a nuisance, as against its use for all purposes,
held, that the owner, in breaking into and using building, is guilty of con-
tempt, though the judge orally advised the sheriff to close it temporarily
only.
Judges merely as judges cannot exercise judicial power. Toledo, A.
A. & G. T. R. Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; Whitlock v. Wade, II7 Iowa
153. The laws fix the time, place, and manner in which judges shall sit as
a court. Blair v. Reading, 99 II. 6oo. It is the duty of a judge to com-
mand, not to advise, and his orders must be reduced to writing. Savings
Bank v. Ball-bearing Chain Co., II8 Iowa, 688; In re Thomas's Estate, 26
Col. Supp. IlO. A reliance upon his oral advice and verbal directions will
not excuse a contempt for disobeying his decrees. Capet v. Parker, 3
Sandf. 662; Tremain v. Richardson, 68 N. Y. 67.
DAMAGES AND MUTILATION OF DEAD BODY-MENTAL SUFFERING.-
KYLEs V. SOUTHERN R. Co., 6i S. E. 278 (N. C.).-Held, that where the
Tights of one legally entitled to the custody of a dead body are violated
by mutilation of body or otherwise, the party injured may in an action for
damages, recover for the mental suffering caused by the injury.
A widow's primary right to bury the body of her deceased husband
is generally recognized. Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R. I. i55; Weld v. Walker,
130 Mass. 422. And a wanton or negligent mutilation of the body is action-
able. Doxtator v. Chicago & W. Mich. R. Co., 12o Mich. 596; Burney v.
Children's Hospital, 169 Mass. 57. Some courts hold that the violation
of this right naturally contemplates injury to the feelings and allow com-
pensation to be recovered for the mental suffering. Larson v. Chase, 47
Minn. 307; Reinham v. Wright, 125 Ind. 536. This rule seems to be fol-
lowed only in those states which hold that damages for injury to the feel-
ings alone is sufficient ground for recovery. Wells Fargo Co.'s Express V.
Fuller, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 61o; Chapman v. Western Union, go Ky. 265.
The rule is repudiated in other states. Long v. Chicago, R. L T. Co., I5
Okl. 512; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. St. 335.
EMINENT DOMAIN-RIGHTS OF PROPERTY OWNERS-WHEN ACQUIRED.-
SIMPSON v. BERxowiTz, i10 N. Y. SuPP. 485. Where public officers passed a
resolution condemning lands, held, that property owners acquire no vested
rights in such proceedings until the report of the Commissioners of
Appraisal is finally confirmed.
While some states hold that the confirmation of the commissioners'
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report in condemnation proceedings completes the taking, and that mutual
rights are thus vested,-Clough v. Unity, 18 N. H. 75; Fischer v Catiwissa
R. Co., 175 Pa. St. 554.-by far the greater number of authorities hold
that the taking is not complete, and the mutual rights are not vested until
payment or the security thereof has been given, or until there has been an
entrance into possession. Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Ind. 272; Carson v.
Hartford, 48 Conn. 68; Chicago v. Barbian, 8o Ill. 482. Nor does a judg-
ment assessing the amount of damages to be paid, bind the party seeking
the land to take the same and pay the damages assessed. Gear v. Dubuque
& S. C. R. Co., 12o Iowa 523.
FIXTURES-LANDLORD AND TENANT.-OGDEN v. GARRISON, 117 N. W.
714 (NEB.).--Hcld, that the execution of a new lease in which the tenant
did not expressly reserve fixtures erected by him under a precefing lease,
does not deprive him of the right to remove them.
The above decision is not in harmony with the weight of authority
holding that, if a tenant enters into a new lease, making no mention of a
former lease and with no reservation for removal of fixtures, placed under
the former lease, his right to remove is thereby precluded. Spencer v.
Comnnercial Co., 3o Wash. 52o; Williams v. Lane, 62 Mo. App. 66. And this
general rule is applied even when the possession is continuous. Loughran
v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792; Watriss v. National Bank of Cambridge, 124 Mass.
571. But in accord with the case at hand, some courts have ruled, that if
a tenant, having fixtures on the premises, secures a new lease in the nature
of an extension of the old lease, and the new lease reserves no right to
remove fixtures, the landlord had no right to restrain removal at or before
expiration of second lease. Radey v. McCurdy, 209 Pa. St. 3o6. In an-
other instance it was held, that if a tenant accepts a new lease from a
subsequent purchaser while in possession which failed to reserve fixtures,
his right of removal was not lost. Daly v. Simonson, 126 Ia. 717.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ToRTS BY HUSBAND AGAINST WIFE-LIABILITY.-
SYKES v. SPEER, ET AL, 112 S. W. 422 (TEx.).-Held, that a wife cannot
sue her husband for torts committed by him against her person or repu-
tation while the marriage relation exists.
At common law, a wife could not sue her husband for any injury to
her person, committed during their coverture. Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb.
641. Nor would an action against him lie for an injury to her
reputation. Mink v. Mink, i6 Pa. Co. Ct. 189. And the right to sue is
not conferred upon wife under modern statutes. Longendyke v. Longen-
dyke, 44 Barb. 367. Public policy forbids that a wife should have a right
to sue husband, and therefore, unless expressly granted in direct terms
by statute, the common law rule is in force. Main v. Main, 46 Ill. App. io6.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-DRIVER OF VEHICLE.-CAMINEZ V.
BROOKLYN Q. C. & S. R. Co., III N. Y. SupP. 384. Held, that where plain-
tiff was riding with the driver of a furniture truck at the time the plaintiff
was injured in a collision between the truck and one of the defendant's
street cars, plaintiff was not chargeable with the negligence of the driver,
but was bound to show that he exercised the care the situation demanded.
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Some authorities hold that if the plaintiff is under the direction of a
third party whose negligence combines with that of the defendant in caus-
ing the injury, he cannot recover, for the negligence of the third party' will
be imputed to him. Lightfoot v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 479;
Paynee v. C., R. I. & P. R. Co., 39 Iowa 523. This doctrine is, however,
denied by the weight of authority. La Bernina, L. R. 12 P. D. 58;
Randolph v. O'Riordon, i55 Mass. 331. And it is laid down by the courts
that follow this rule, that the plaintiff must have exercised ordinary care
under the circumstances of the case to have prevented the injury. G. H.
& S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643; Dean v. Penn. R. Co., 129 Pa. 514.
But where the plaintiff stands in such a position to third persons that he
can direct or control their movements, the negligence of such third persons
is to be imputed to him. Knightstown v. Musgrove, II6 Ind. 121.
NEGLIGENCE-LICENSEE-USE OF FOOTPATHS.-PHIPPS V. OREGON R.
& N. Co., I6I FED. 376 (WASH.).-Held, that one who, without objecting,
knowingly, and for a long time, permits the public to use his premises, for
the purpose of traveling across the same upon a well-established path,
cannot, without giving notice, render the same unsafe to the injury of those
who have used the highway and have no notice of the changed condition
without responding in damages for the resulting injury.
A licensee may be one, who, either alone or in common with the
public, has for a long time used a footpath over lands of another with
his knowledge and without objection. Norfolk & W. R. R. Co. v. De-
Board's Admr., 91 Va. 700. Many states hold that one is not liable for
negligence, not willful, to a licensee using his premises. Rcdigan v. Boston
& Me. R. R., 155 Mass. 44; Lingenfelter v. Bait. & 0. S. R. R., 154 Ind.
49. But the weight of authority modifies this rule and holds that there is
a duty attached to the owner of premises to use ordinary care to protect
licensees from unusual dangers in the same created by his own positive
acts. Rooney v. Woolworth, 68 Conn. 167; Payne v. N. Y., N. H. & H.
R. R. Co., io4 N. Y.. 362. Where licensees use railroad premises for a
footpath, the company is not restricted in the ordinary operation of its road.
Sutton v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 243. But where a path has
been used daily by numbers of people as licensees, the owner is bound to
anticipate their presence with reasonable regard for their safety. Porn-
ponio v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 66 Conn. 528.
TELEGRAPHS-CIPHER MESSAGES.-WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO. V.
MERRITT, 46 So. io24 (FL.).-Held, where the message is delivered for
transmission in cipher and is unintelligible except to the sender and ad-
dressee, and no explanation is made to the operator as to its import and
importance, the telegraph company is liable for transmitting it incor-
rectly in nominal damages only, or at most the sum paid for its transmis-
sion and delivery.
It is a general rule that damages resulting from the breach of a con-
tract which were not contemplated by defendant, but arise from special
circumstances unknown to him, cannot be compensated. Hence, in many
jurisdictions, where a message does not show upon its face that it relates
to transactions of importance and that pecuniary loss will probably result
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unless it is promptly and correctly transmitted, as where it is written in
cipher, recovery will be limited to nominal damages, or at most the price
paid for sending the message. Alheles v. Western Union, 37 Mo. App.
554; Cannon v. Western Union, ioo N. C. 3oo. But it is also a general
rule that the direct loss resulting from the breach of a contract may be
recovered even though it is wholly unexpected, and, consequently, some
courts have held that the direct damage resulting from breach of a con-
tract to transmit a cipher message is the value of the information con-
tained, and that this value and not the consideration paid for sending the
message should be the measure of damages. Western Union v. Fotman,
73 Ga. 285; Am. Union Tel. Co. v. Doughter3, 89 Ala. i91.
